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ABSTRACT 
 
 
A Regulatory Analysis of the Specific Allocation Fund (DAK) 
and Horizontal Equalization in Indonesia* 
Donald Feaver  
RMIT University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter examines the regulatory arrangements implemented by the Republic of 
Indonesia governing intergovernmental fiscal arrangements relating to specific 
funding allocations. The Specific Allocation Fund (DAK) is a statutorily created and 
governed policy instrument enabling the central government to make ‘specific’ fiscal 
transfers to regional and district governments that qualify for horizontal equalization 
assistance. The question that forms the basis of this chapter is whether the measures 
implemented to achieve DAK policy objectives constitute a coherent and 
operationally effective regulatory scheme. The mechanics and operational well 
functioning of the regulatory scheme are analyzed by examining the regulatory 
coherence of the statutory arrangements underlying the DAK. An outcome of this 
analysis includes consideration of the benefits of creating of a special administrative 
body to improve the functioning of the regulatory scheme. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
*
A background paper on the study “The Specific Allocation Fund (DAK): Mechanisms and Uses”, a joint 
study by The SMERU Research Institute and the Institute for Ethics, Governance and Law, Griffith 
University, funded by the Australia-Indonesia Governance Research Partnership (AIGRP) 
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I. OVERVIEW 
 
 
The 2001 Indonesian ‘big-bang’ policies of decentralizing the delivery of public services 
and redistributing intergovernmental fiscal transfers are examples of the trend towards a 
‘decentring’ of government that is occurring around the world. The decentring of 
government is defined as a re-allocation of governance functions and fiscal arrangements 
relating to the provision of public goods and services. Where public goods and services 
were previously supplied through highly bureaucratic and centralized governmental 
arrangements, the decentring process involves the transfer of public administrative 
responsibilities to more localized, and often specialized, decision-makers (Black 2001). 
The means by which the decentring process is coordinated, managed and controlled is 
through statutory instruments that employ a range of regulatory devices and techniques 
(including the use of specialist decision-making bodies) to implement policy objectives 
(de Mello and Barenstein 2001; Bardham 2002). 
 
This chapter focuses on the regulatory mechanism implemented by the Republic of 
Indonesia governing intergovernmental fiscal arrangements relating to specific funding 
allocations. In Indonesia, the need for equitable and effective intergovernmental funding 
arrangements has arisen within the broader context of ‘big-bang’ decentralization in two 
respects. First, Indonesia is a unitary state in which the constitutional power to levy, 
collect, and allocate public revenue is controlled by the central government. In shifting 
public administrative responsibilities away from the central government to regional 
governments, intergovernmental fiscal arrangements have also had to be reformed to 
overcome the vertical funding imbalance among the different levels of central, regional, 
and local government (World Bank 2006). The second major fiscal challenge arises from 
horizontal differences in the levels of human and economic development that exist 
within and between different regions within Indonesia. It is this issue, and the regulatory 
mechanism implemented to address it, that is the particular focus of this chapter. The 
DAK is a statutorily created and governed policy instrument enabling the central 
government to make ‘specific’ fiscal transfers to regional and district governments that 
qualify for horizontal equalization assistance.1 
 
The question that forms the basis of this chapter is whether the measures implemented 
to achieve DAK policy objectives constitute a coherent and operationally effective 
regulatory scheme. The mechanics and operational well functioning of the regulatory 
scheme are analyzed by examining the regulatory coherence of the statutory arrangements 
underlying the DAK. The coherence analysis is conducted across several dimensions. 
First, the DAK has quasi-constitutional characteristics that must be taken into 
consideration. The DAK does not exist within a legal vacuum and must conform to 
existing constitutional principles and limitations. Second, the policy objectives of the 
DAK are highly integrated with other fiscal transfer policies (i.e., vertical equalization and 
the General Allocation Fund (DAU)) and must operate in a manner that compliments 
broader fiscal policy objectives. Finally, the specific statutory instruments enacted to 
implement the DAK must conform to minimum standards of internal instrumental 
coherence evaluated against a test whether the regulatory framework is comprised of a 
                                               
1There is a great deal of research examining the policy underpinnings of intergovernmental fiscal arrangements. 
Vertical and horizontal equalization objectives are traditional motives for equalization schemes. It is not within 
the scope of this paper to examine the political and economic motives for implementing equalization schemes. 
For a review of the broad principles, see Bird (1993) and Ter-Minassian (1997). 
The SMERU Research Institute 2 
relatively stable set of interrelated rules and incentives that constitute coherent 
procedures intended to achieve substantive goals (Weimer 1995). 
 
To this end, the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, a brief overview of 
theoretical concepts and tools are reviewed. In particular, the notion of regulatory 
coherence is introduced and explained. In Section 3, a description of the structure and 
operation of the regulatory scheme as it now exists is undertaken. Section 4 builds on 
Section 3 by conducting an analysis of the regulatory coherence of the DAK conforming 
to the broad theoretical framework presented in Section 2. The coherence analysis 
conducted in Section 4 provides insight into certain mechanical weaknesses of the 
current DAK arrangements. A proposal with which to overcome these mechanical 
weaknesses through the creation of an administrative decision-making body having 
special powers is considered by examining the purpose and function of the Australian 
Government’s Commonwealth Grants Commission. A brief summary and conclusion is 
included in Section 6. 
 
 
II. RELEVANT THEORY: FISCAL RELATIONS, 
SUBSIDIARITY AND REGULATORY COHERENCE 
 
 
The regulatory coherence of the legislative scheme governing the allocation of the DAK 
is to be evaluated against the principle that: to have and maintain coherence and integrity; 
the purpose of law, the structure and function of legal systems, and the integrity of legal 
processes all must exhibit some degree of consistency and coherence. In a mechanistic 
sense, coherence can be described as an organizing principle that exhibits certain 
properties. The basic properties it exhibits emerge when it is used to evaluate the 
characteristics of linkages among and between abstract concepts. If a linkage of concepts 
or ideas is not coherent, the outcome will be a cognitive friction and conceptual 
instability.2 This may be described as an incoherent outcome. If the linkage of ideas 
exhibits a more logical and functional interoperability among interrelated concepts, it is 
probable that more stable, predictable, and consistent outcomes will be achieved. 
Coherence, in brief, describes qualitative patterns in the arrangement of abstract ideas. 
 
When applied to the analysis of regulation and regulatory schemes, coherence theory is 
closely related to the concept of regulatory failure. Although there is little agreement in 
the literature about what regulatory failure is or how it can be objectively recognized or 
explained (Lodge 2002), Breyer’s classical legal definition of regulatory failure provides a 
useful starting principle. Breyer’s definition states that regulatory schemes fail when 
regulatory instruments are mismatched to the context in which they are applied (Breyer 1983). 
Although broad, the definition implicitly identifies the requirement for consistency 
between the social problem underlying the need for a regulatory solution and the choice 
of regulatory machinery implemented to address that problem. 
 
 
                                               
2An idea common to all applications is the fundamental principle that a legal regime is more likely to 
generate incoherent outcomes if the relationship between the parts of the whole is not, conceptually, in 
alignment with components both of the legal system itself, but also with other social structures extending 
beyond the legal system (Balkin 1993). 
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To satisfy coherence requirements, a regulatory arrangement should exhibit three levels 
of regulatory coherence: systemic coherence, policy coherence, and instrumental 
coherence. Systemic coherence is an actual or ideal feature of a regulatory arrangement 
where its components fit together: either all of them (global systemic coherence) or some 
of them (local systemic coherence). Figure 1 illustrates how a regulatory arrangement is 
systemically coherent where the underlying social need for regulation and the normative 
policy foundations formulated to address that need are theoretically in alignment. In 
making the conceptual linkage between social need and normative policy, systemic 
coherence implies a requirement for a logical connection between the motivation for 
regulating (foundationalist approach) and the theoretical concepts that shapes a 
regulatory order (non-foundationalist approach) (Bertea 2005). This notion of a systemic 
coherence is also reflected in the constructivist ideal that regulatory institutions and rules 
are abstract social constructs created to serve the needs of a social order (or relevant 
suborders) in accordance with a particular social context. As the needs of societies and 
communities change, so too should the regulatory institutions and instruments that 
govern them (Prosser 1997). Regulatory policies that do not evolve and regulatory 
instruments that are not reformed to reflect systemic change will eventually fail in their 
regulatory objectives (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992). 
 
The next level of regulatory coherence identified in Figure 1 is the requirement for 
alignment between the normative policy foundations and positive rules referred to as 
policy coherence. Policy coherence encompasses internal and external dimensions. Internal 
coherence is determined by whether the normative policy foundations are in alignment 
with policy choices embodied in the positive legal instruments formalizing the regulatory 
architecture. External coherence, also known as comparative coherence, has two 
subdimensions: within category and across category coherences (Sunstein et al. 2002). 
Within category coherence is defined as regulation that is consistent with other 
regulations of the same general type. Regulations are coherent across category where the 
overall pattern of regulations makes sense across different regulatory categories. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Social Need 
Improved public 
service levels and 
delivery 
 
Normative Policy 
Decentralization and 
vertical and horizontal 
equalization 
Positive Rules 
Law No. 32 and No. 33 of 
2004; Government 
Regulation No. 55 of 
2005 
Systemic 
Coherence 
Policy 
Coherence 
Instrumental 
Coherence 
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Finally, instrumental coherence reflects the positive dimension of regulation and is evaluated 
on the basis of whether the regulatory machinery, or means, chosen is consistent with 
and contributes to a well-functioning regulatory system. Regulation fails to make 
instrumental sense if its underlying social motives and normative policy foundations are 
not reflected in the positive instruments chosen and implemented. Instrumental 
incoherence arises where regulatory instruments (institutions and rules) are ineffectual, 
produce unintended consequences, or impose far too many costs relative to the social 
benefits they achieve (Coglianese 2002). Regulatory coherence, therefore, implies a 
consistency among all three dimensions of coherence. 
 
However, the regulatory coherence of the DAK is more complicated than conventional 
regulatory schemes because of its quasi-constitutional characteristics.3 The regulatory 
coherence of the DAK has two constitutional dimensions: one explicit, the other implicit 
(or extraconstitutional). The explicit constitutional provision that impacts upon the 
design and operation of the DAK is Article 18A (2) of the 1945 Constitution of the 
Republic of Indonesia which states that: 
 
The relations between the central government and regional authorities in finances, 
public services, and the use of natural and other resources shall be regulated and 
administered with justice and equity according to law. 
 
The implications of Article 18A (2) are evaluated within a coherence framework and are 
discussed in further detail in Section 5 below. 
  
The second constitutional dimension of the DAK is derived from a source external to 
the Indonesian Constitution. In the absence of any explicit constitutional provision to 
the contrary, the extraconstitutional principle of subsidiarity (where it is possible for 
decisions to be taken at more than one level of government, decisions should be taken at 
the most decentralized level practicable) is becoming an increasingly accepted, but vague, 
guide as to the allocation of power (and funding) among different levels of government. 
Because of the breadth and generality of the subsidiarity principle, it can only be used to 
provide a guide as to the general contours of the coherence of DAK allocation 
arrangements. Even despite of its generality, subsidiarity is a useful principle in guiding 
statutory reform as discussed in Section 4 and Section 5. 
 
 
III. THE STRUCTURE AND OPERATION OF THE 
REGULATORY SCHEME 
 
 
The structure and operation of the regulatory scheme relating to the DAK are relatively 
uncomplicated. In this section, the statutory architecture of the scheme is briefly 
described, highlighting its structure, composition, and administrative decision-making 
features. Certain aspects of the regulatory arrangement that are of particular relevance are 
identified and discussed. 
                                               
3Coherence can be used to analyze systems of law, the relationship between legal principles, or the linkage of 
ideas in the legal reasoning process. The theories and approaches can be divided into two broad types: structural 
theories of coherence which explain the linkage and interaction of parts of a legal regime (Dworkin 1986; Raz 
1994); and the more mechanical, interpretive theories that focus on processes of legal reasoning and the linkage 
of arguments (McCormick 1984). 
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3.1 General Legislative Considerations 
 
The DAK is one of several funding mechanisms designed to support the broader central 
government policy initiative of bureaucratic and fiscal decentralization. The DAK and all 
other funding mechanisms must conform (as previously noted) to the constitutional 
requirement of Article 18A (2) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia 
which states that: 
 
The relations between the central government and regional authorities in finances, 
public services, and the use of natural and other resources shall be regulated and 
administered with justice and equity according to law. 
 
Article 18A (2) provides a constitutional principle, or boundary, that disciplines the 
several decentralized funding mechanisms enacted in Law No. 33 of 2004 concerning 
Fiscal Balance Between the Central Government and the Regional Governments (Law 
No. 33). Within this boundary, the purpose of these funding mechanisms is stated in the 
commencing Considerations of Law No. 33 as: 
 
That in support of regional autonomy through the provision of sources of financing 
based on the authority of the central government, decentralization, deconcentration, 
and co-administration, the sharing of revenues between the central government and 
the regional governments need to be clearly established in a financial system based on 
the sharing of authority, task, and responsibility among the government agencies. 
 
The importance of this Consideration is that it provides a policy directive setting out the 
broad principles underlying Law No. 33 relating to the ‘sharing of revenues’. How this 
revenue is to be shared is based upon ‘the sharing of authority, task and responsibility 
among the government agencies’. Further specificity is added through the general 
provisions in Article 1 (3) of Law No. 33, which provides that 
 
revenue sharing between the government and the regional governments means a fair, 
proportional, democratic, transparent, and efficient sharing of revenues in the 
financing of decentralization, deconcentration, and co-administration with due regard 
to the potential, condition, and need of the regions. 
  
The broad principles of revenue sharing (as it applies to all the funding mechanisms) 
contained in Law No. 33 are articulated in Article 2, which provides that 
 
(1) revenue sharing between the government and the regional governments is a 
subsystem of the state finances as a consequence of the sharing of task between 
the government and the regional governments; 
(2) sources of state finances are made available to the regional governments in the 
implementation of decentralization based on the transfer of task by the central 
government to the regional governments with due regard to fiscal stability and 
fiscal balance; and 
(3) revenue sharing between the government and the regional governments is a 
comprehensive system in the funding of decentralization, deconcentration, and 
co-administration. 
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Article 2 performs two important functions. First, Article 2 (1) clearly identifies the 
source of power and control as being retained within the jurisdiction of the central 
government in that the task of revenue sharing is deemed to be a ‘subsystem’ of central 
government finances. The importance of this provision is that there is no delegation of any 
administrative decision-making powers or authority to the regional governments (except 
where otherwise provided for explicitly by statute). The significance of this provision is 
discussed further in Section 4 and Section 5 below. Second, Article 2 (2) provides that 
state finances will be made available to the regional governments ‘having due regard to 
fiscal stability and fiscal balance’. Article 2 (2) is particularly relevant in relation to the 
DAK because it provides the statutory basis for ‘horizontally’ distinguishing between 
different regions on the basis of their fiscal circumstances. It, therefore, provides the 
statutory authority for creating the horizontal equalization mechanism that is described in 
Part Four of Law No. 33. 
 
3.2 The Regulatory Framework of the DAK 
 
The DAK is a specific allocation fund. As a regulatory device, its purpose is to address 
horizontal inequalities in financial capacity and levels of economic development between 
different regions within Indonesia. In effect, the fund is targeted towards providing 
central government funds to those regions that are deemed to need additional funding to 
bring the provision of public services (in seven key sectors) to a level that would not be 
possible without specific funding allocations. The total amount of DAK funding is set 
annually by the central government.4 In the absence of provisions indicating how the size 
of the annual DAK allocation is to be determined, the composition of the DAK appears 
to be highly discretionary and is, therefore, subject to change from year to year having 
implications for regional planning and development initiatives. 
 
The structure of the regulatory framework is parsimonious and broadly worded. Article 
39 identifies and attaches the ‘specific’ status to the DAK by limiting its allocation to 
‘certain’ regions as a ‘specific fund’. The main substantive provisions are contained in 
Article 40, which sets the broad eligibility criteria by providing that:5 
  
(1)  the government shall establish criteria for DAK, including general criteria, 
specific criteria, and technical criteria; 
(2)  general criteria referred to in paragraph (1) shall be established with due regard 
to the financial capacity of the region in APBD; 
(3)  specific criteria referred to paragraph (1) shall be established with due regard to 
the prevailing laws and regulations and the characteristics of the region; and 
(4)  technical criteria referred to in paragraph (1) shall be established by the state 
ministry/technical department. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
4 See Article 38 of Law No. 33, which provides that the amount of the Specific Allocation Fund (DAK) 
shall be established annually in APBN (the national budget). 
5 See also Article 41 of Law No. 33, which provides that (1) all regions receiving the DAK shall provide co-
funding in an amount of at least 10% (ten percent) of the DAK allocation; (2) co-funding referred to in 
paragraph (1) shall be budgeted in APBD (the regional budget); and (3) a region with a certain fiscal 
capacity shall not be required to provide co-funding. 
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The lack of prescription in Article 40 is to be addressed through regulations made by the 
central government.6 The relevant regulation that is now in force is Government 
Regulation No. 55 of 2005 regarding Balance Funds (Government Regulation No. 55). 
Government Regulation No. 55 is significant in that it allocates the responsibility of 
administering functions relating to the financial management of the DAK to the Minister 
of Finance. More significantly, Article 54 (3) of Government Regulation No. 55 provides 
insight into the mechanics of how the fund is to be calculated and allocated: 
 
Besaran alokasi DAK masing-masing daerah sebagaimana dimaksud pada ayat (1) 
huruf b ditentukan dengan perhitungan indeks berdasarkan kriteria umum, kriteria 
khusus, dan kriteria teknis. 
 
[The DAK grant referred to in paragraph (1) (of Article 54) is determined with the 
calculation of an index based on the general criteria, the specific criteria, and the 
technical criteria.] 
 
The rough English translation of Article 54 (3) of Government Regulation No. 55 of 
2005 refers to the method of allocation of the DAK as being based on the calculation of 
an index (or formula) derived from the general, specific, and technical criteria referred to 
in Article 40 of Law No. 33 of 2004. The construction, calculation, and administration of 
the allocation formula are the substantive core of the regulatory arrangement and, 
accordingly, warrant special attention. It is important to note that the administrative 
authority to construct and apply the formula in the course of DAK allocation falls within 
the scope of responsibility of the Ministry of Finance with the input and assistance of 
other relevant Ministries. Government Regulation No. 55 of 2005 provides a general 
procedural roadmap indicating which relevant government ministries are expected to 
contribute required statistical information to enable the Ministry of Finance to apply the 
formula constructed to guide DAK allocation. 
 
3.3 Core Regulatory Composition: The Eligibility Test 
 
The substantive core of the regulatory scheme is the method (and formula-based 
regulatory mechanism) by which eligibility for the DAK is calculated and tested. The 
basis, but not detailed explanation, of the formula is contained in Government 
Regulation No. 55 of 2005. Government Regulation No. 55, however, only directs the 
use of certain indices as part of the formula’s composition. The Ministry of Finance 
conducts the construction and application of the formula that is actually used. The 
essential feature of a formula allocation program such as the DAK is that the amounts to 
be allocated are determined by a formula that uses statistical information to calculate or 
estimate the values of its inputs, and these are processed to produce outputs. Often, the 
allocation process consists of a basic calculation using a mathematical formula or 
algorithm, followed by adjustments that place constraints on levels or shares (percentages 
of the total allocation) or on changes in levels or shares. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
6See Article 42 of Law No. 33, which provides that further provisions on the DAK shall be established by 
government regulations. 
The SMERU Research Institute 8 
The Formula and its Calculation 
 
Step 1: The determination whether a district/city is eligible to receive the 
DAK under the general criteria provisions of Law No. 33 is derived from 
Net Fiscal Index (NFI) NFI<1; 
 
Step 2: If a district/city does not fulfill the general criteria; whether the 
city/district falls within a special autonomy region (districts/cities within the 
Provinces of Aceh and Papua). If yes, the district/city is eligible to receive 
the DAK; 
 
Step 3: If a district/city is not under the territory of the provinces of Aceh or 
Papua, it may qualify for DAK funding under the specific criteria provisions. 
A city/district that satisfies the specific criteria requirements include coastal 
and offshore areas, areas bordering a foreign country, remote areas, and areas 
prone to floods and landslides, and food shortages. The specific criteria 
characteristics of such a city/district is calculated and reflected by the 
Regional Characteristic Index (RCI); 
 
Step 4: Combine NFI and RCI to generate a composite Fiscal and Regional 
Index (FRI); 
 
Step 5: If a district/city has an FRI calculation less than 1, then the 
respective district/city is automatically eligible to receive DAK (although, 
initially based on Step 1, is not eligible to receive DAK). Conversely, if the 
respective district/city has FRI greater than 1, then it will not be eligible to 
receive DAK; 
 
Step 6: Districts/cities that are eligible to receive DAK are districts/cities 
that fulfill Step 1 (where NFI<1); or fulfill Step 2 (districts/cities under the 
territories of the provinces of Aceh or Papua, no matter their NFI>1 or 
NFI<1); or fulfill Step 5 where their FRI < 1; 
 
Step 7: For all districts/cities which are eligible based on Step 6, the 
calculation FRI = f(NFI,RCI) must be made; 
 
Step 8: A weight of region (WR) calculation is made by multiplying the local 
FRI and Construction Cost Index (CCI); 
 
Step 9: For all eligible districts/cities, a Technical Index (TI) is calculated for 
each sector that will be given DAK; 
 
Step 10: A calculation of the Technical Weight (TW) is conducted by 
multiplying the Technical Index (TI) and Construction Cost Index (CCI); 
 
Step 11: The determination of DAK weight is derived from the result of 
addition of Weight of Region (WR) and Technical Index (TI); 
 
Step 12: The Weight of DAK determines the amount of each individual 
district/city’s DAK. 
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IV. REGULATORY COHERENCE ANALYSIS 
 
 
In this section, an analysis of the regulatory coherence of the DAK allocation 
arrangements described in Section 3 is conducted conforming to the theoretical 
framework presented in Section 2. The three dimensions of regulatory coherence are 
discussed in the subsections that follow, beginning with an analysis of the systemic 
coherence of the regulatory scheme. This is followed by a brief analysis of policy 
coherence. Finally, and most importantly, emphasis is placed on an analysis of the 
instrumental coherence of the scheme including its structure, composition, and 
administrative decision-making features. 
  
4.1 Systemic Coherence 
 
The systemic coherence of the regulatory mechanics of the DAK allocation scheme is 
evaluated within the context of two general parameters. One parameter is the consistency 
of the regulatory scheme’s objectives and functions with the normative social need (being 
the underlying justification) for regulatory intervention (Baldwin and Caves 1999). A 
second general parameter is any constitutional boundaries or constraints (principles) that 
impose limits on the design and operation of the regulatory scheme. Both parameters 
represent underlying and pervasive systemic forces that impact upon the DAK’s 
coherence as a well-functioning regulatory scheme. The concept of systemic coherence is 
derived from the principle that all regulatory schemes are regulatory systems that are 
embedded within, and can therefore only achieve their regulatory objectives if they bear 
an intersystemic coherence and consistency with, the larger socio-legal system within 
which they operate (Balkin 1993). 
 
The normative social need for the creation of the DAK is motivated by the requirement 
for a regulatory device that, consistent with the twin policy objectives of decentralization 
and deconcentration, provides a horizontal equalization mechanism to improve human 
welfare in the more disadvantaged regions of Indonesia. Implicit in the normative 
objective is the assumption that equalization may require an unequal, and hence ‘specific’, 
distribution of funding to regions that have a greater financial need than others. In this 
context, the DAK appears to be systemically coherent in that its regulatory objectives are 
consistent with its underlying normative rational. 
 
The analysis, however, becomes more problematic where the normative basis of the 
scheme is analyzed relative to the existing constitutional boundaries: in particular, Article 
18A of the Constitution. The question is whether there is consistency between the 
general principles of Article 18A of the Constitution and the specific purpose and 
function of the DAK. Given that Article 18A makes it a constitutional requirement that 
fiscal measures ‘be regulated and administered with justice and equity according to law’, 
the definition of ‘equitable’ in this context is of particular importance. In effect, to be 
systemically coherent, the regulatory mechanism underlying the DAK must satisfy the 
requirements of what constitutes ‘equitable’ within the meaning of the law. 
 
‘Equitable’ has slightly different meanings in law and economics. If a legal definition of 
equitable is followed, equity has traditionally been used within common law countries to 
achieve distributive fairness and natural justice. It is a term that, in a legal context, has 
historically meant the taking of measures to achieve a just outcome to ensure that the law 
accords equal treatment of equal or similar parties. Equality runs counter to the concept 
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of an unequal distribution of funding and hence, the concept of specific funding that 
may result in an unequal allocation. Read in this sense, the DAK, it can be argued, is not 
only incoherent in a regulatory context, but also could be unconstitutional as violating 
Article 18A if the DAK allocation method is deemed, for some reasons, not to be 
equitable (Elkins 2006). 
 
The alternative view is that a purely legal reading of Article 18A ignores its legislative and 
technical contexts (Buchanan 1950). Given that Article 18A (2) is related to public 
finance, it is logical that a definition of equity drawn from welfare economics was 
intended by the constitutional drafters, or should apply.7 In welfare economics, the term 
equitable does not mean proportional; it has been taken to mean, since the rise of the 
welfare state in the post WW II world, ‘what a given society deems appropriate to the 
need, status, and contribution of a society’s members’ (Young 1994). The large body of 
literature linking notions of fiscal equity with broader concepts of social justice has long 
been accepted as a legitimate basis for horizontal equalization schemes. However, it 
should be noted that in recent years, the equity/equality debate in relation to horizontal 
equalization schemes has become the subject of increasing scrutiny (particularly in a 
constitutional context in the United States) (Elkins 2006). 
 
4.2 Policy Coherence and Horizontal Equalization 
 
As mentioned in Section 2, the policy coherence of a regulatory scheme implies that the 
policy under review is externally consistent with other interrelated policies as well as 
internally consistent with the regulatory mechanisms chosen to implement the policy. 
Policy consistency in relation to fiscal transfer mechanisms, in general, and the DAK, in 
particular, is closely related to the combined policy objectives of vertical and horizontal 
equalizations. In spite of the increasing scrutiny of horizontal equalization schemes, there 
is an acceptance around the world that both horizontal and vertical fiscal transfer 
mechanisms are legitimate and necessary components of fiscal policy (OECD 2007). 
 
Both vertical and horizontal equalizations are fundamental regulatory components of 
Law No. 33 of 2004. However, it is clear from reading the Considerations preceding the 
substantive provisions of Law No. 33 that the law’s policy emphasis is directed towards 
vertical equalization with little or no specific mention of the importance of and need for 
horizontal equalization mechanisms. Although this is not fatal in practical terms and does 
not unduly affect the functioning of the horizontal equalization mechanism, the absence 
of a policy statement appears contrary to the increasing importance of the DAK in terms 
of its growth in budgetary size as well as its important function. 
 
In practical terms, Law No. 33 has three policy objectives. However, when the general 
policy objectives contained in the Considerations of Law No. 33 of 2004 are 
deconstructed, only two policy objectives can be identified as being specified. The first, 
and most broad, is that Law No. 33 of 2004 is a comprehensive enactment governing a 
range of fiscal measures aligned with the political/institutional decentralization and 
deconcentration initiatives of the ‘big-bang’ decentralization policy. The second, more 
specific policy objective is directed towards vertical equalization through the statement of 
a general policy principle intended to apply to the several different funding mechanisms 
contained in Law No. 33 (such as the DAU, DBH, or the Shared Revenue Fund, and 
                                               
7It should be noted that Article 18A (2) is a recent constitutional amendment made at or around the time 
of the decentralization initiatives. 
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loan facilities). As a consequence, there is no clear policy prescription that applies 
specifically to the DAK. 
 
The third policy objective of horizontal equalization, therefore, is not mentioned in the 
Considerations preceding the substantive provisions of Law No. 33. Of all the funding 
mechanisms contained in Law No. 33, the DAK in particular warrants specific policy 
consideration and statutory mention (useful for the purposes of interpretation in the 
event of legal challenge) because of its exceptional status and function. The absence of a 
general policy prescription for the purpose and function of the DAK within the broader 
policy context of Law No. 33 produces a logical inconsistency between the general policy 
principles of Law No. 33 and the exceptional purpose of the DAK. Because the DAK is 
not a fund to be allocated on the basis of equitable proportionality and, arguably, serves a 
broader policy function than merely as a ‘topping up’ fund available to the most 
disadvantaged regions, both the absence of a specific mention in the Considerations and 
relative lack of prescription of the substantive provisions (discussed in greater detail 
below) regarding the DAK contained in Law No. 33 lead to the outcome of some degree 
(though far from disabling) of policy incoherence. 
 
4.3 Instrumental Coherence 
 
Minimum standards of internal instrumental coherence are evaluated against a test 
whether the regulatory framework is comprised of a relatively stable set of interrelated 
rules and incentives that constitute coherent procedures intended to achieve substantive 
goals (March and Olsen 1996). More succinctly, the question is whether the regulatory 
machinery (the means and techniques chosen to implement the policy) contributes to a 
well-functioning regulatory system. A regulatory scheme fails to be instrumentally coherent 
if its underlying social motives and normative policy foundations are not reflected in the 
positive instruments chosen and implemented. In addition, instrumental incoherence can 
arise where regulatory instruments (institutions and rules) are vague and ineffectual, 
produce unintended consequences, or impose far too many costs relative to the social 
benefits they achieve (Coglianese 2002). Instrumental coherence is evaluated by 
examining 
 the structural characteristics, consistency, and transparency of the regulatory scheme; 
 the substantive composition being completeness and effectiveness of the principal 
rules which form the core of the regulatory scheme; and 
 the administrative coherence of the critical decision-making powers allocated within 
the statutory framework to the main administrative decision-makers, including 
how those powers are exercised. 
 
Structural Coherence 
 
The basic structural characteristics of a regulatory scheme are determined by its type (or 
technique), its organizational/institutional characteristics, and the legal relationship 
between the actors involved and affected by the scheme. Different regulatory techniques 
utilize different methods to both discipline actors and encourage compliance with a 
particular scheme. For example, compliance may be achieved through cooperation, 
consensus, incentive, or the use of coercive authority (Morgan and Yeung 2006). The 
most appropriate and effective regulatory model chosen will be dictated by the 
circumstances giving rise to its need (Mitnick 1980; J.Q. Wilson 1982; Breyer 1982; Ogus 
2002). 
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The regulatory type (or technique) that best describes the regulatory scheme underlying 
the DAK is a traditional command and control model using a formula- based funding 
allocation method (commonly known as formula-based regulation (FBR)) (Downes and 
Pogue 2002). The vast majority of the administrative and specialist decision-making 
functions that attach to the scheme are held and exercised by ministries. Although 
regional and district governments are the targeted beneficiaries of the scheme, the main 
actors responsible for carrying out functions under the scheme are agencies and 
authorities at the central level. Finally, the structure of a regulatory scheme is partially 
determined by the institutional and instrumental forms that are created to implement the 
scheme. 
 
There appear to be several issues relating to the structural coherence of the regulatory 
scheme. Upon reading Law No. 33 of 2004 and Government Regulation No. 55 of 2005, 
it is not entirely clear, in terms of a coordination of statutorily directed functions, what 
tasks must be conducted by various ministries. Although the Ministry of Finance is 
ultimately responsible for the overall administration of the scheme, there is no clear 
directive as to what its specific functions in relation to the scheme are and, as a result, 
there is no clear chain of authority among and between other relevant ministries. Hence, 
there is a problem of transparency. 
 
A second structural consideration relates to contemporary perspectives on what 
constitutes good regulation and the constitutional issue of subsidiarity. As part of a move 
away from command and control regulation in preference of more consensus-oriented 
techniques, the importance of the role of all stakeholders in the regulatory process, 
including those being regulated or who are the beneficiary of the regulation, is 
increasingly being recognized (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992). Greater stakeholder 
participation (being participation by district and regional governments) in the policy-
making and management functions of the DAK would further two objectives. First, it 
conforms to contemporary concepts of what constitutes good regulatory design where 
better information flow and administrative decision-making is gained through better 
stakeholder interaction. Second, better stakeholder participation on the part of district 
and regional governments accords with the extraconstitutional principle of subsidiarity 
also improving the distribution of information, inputs, and functions among all levels of 
government in the regulatory scheme. Given that the regional and district governments 
have only a minor role to play in the administration of the scheme, the imbalance in 
stakeholder involvement may be considered a source of potential structural incoherence. 
 
Compositional Coherence 
 
The compositional coherence of a regulatory scheme is evaluated by examining whether 
the substantive provisions provide sufficient and clear directives that, if carried out as 
required, produce the intended regulatory outcome. The main compositional provisions 
of the DAK are contained in Articles 39–42 of Law No. 33 of 2004. As mentioned 
above, the Articles are not highly prescriptive providing that DAK allocations are to be 
made according to vague eligibility criteria. The lack of prescription as to eligibility 
criteria and complete absence of clear procedural rules as to how to apply for DAK and 
less than clear rules relating to the administration of the scheme raise questions relating 
to transparency and accessibility issues underlying the regulatory process. 
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However, the general Articles 39–42 of Law No. 33 of 2004 are supplemented and 
expanded upon by Articles 51–58 of Government Regulation No. 55. The absence of 
clear eligibility requirements in Law No. 33 are partially overcome through the inclusion 
of the index-driven formula (index-based calculation) authorized by Government 
Regulation No. 55. However, in mandating the use of the index-based calculation as the 
sole basis for testing DAK eligibility, the distribution of the fund is entirely determined 
by statistical data reflecting the relative difference across the regions and districts. 
Although it does not represent compositional incoherence in its own right, the complete 
reliance on a statistical formula as the only allocation mechanism risks producing 
incoherent outcomes. This, for example, can arise where the nature of the data used to 
apply the eligibility formula is insufficiently sensitive to capture particular population 
pockets or community groups that should otherwise be eligible for DAK funding. 
Conversely, misallocations due to statistical variation or inherent bias in formula inputs 
may result in regions that would not be eligible and can result in a channelling of 
resources away from their intended purpose. 
 
Formula-driven regulation is not uncommon where a bureaucratic arm of government is 
charged with the responsibility of managing a regulatory process. The application of a 
formula removes the need to grant special discretionary decision-making powers to the 
bureaucratic administrator. Formula-based regulation can work effectively but also has two 
major drawbacks. First, the formula may not work equitably in all circumstances resulting in 
exceptional cases of ‘falling between cracks’ as well as other funding misallocation problems. 
Second, (as is the case with the DAK scheme) bureaucratic decision-makers are not granted 
the authority to correct for the administrative rigidity and inflexibility of the formula and 
frequently do not have the discretionary powers to override inequitable outcomes without 
special intervention by a minister or the legislature. 
 
Neither Law No. 33 nor Government Regulation No. 55 appears to provide much 
prescription or direction in the decision on the basic formula to be used, the more 
specific variables (e.g., population size, tax revenue, per capita income), the formula 
components, and the statistical data series to be used to calculate or estimate their values. 
Given that the formula does exist and is being maintained and utilized by the Ministry of 
Finance, the absence of a monitoring and oversight mechanism is a potential source of 
regulatory failure. 
 
Administrative Coherence 
 
As mentioned above, one of the purposes in implementing formula-based regulatory 
arrangements is that it reduces the need for legislators to transfer discretionary decision-
making powers to regulatory administrators. Given that the core substantive provisions 
of the DAK are dealt with through a formula-based arrangement, most administrative 
considerations are related to the creation, maintenance, and application of the formula. 
The responsibility for the creation, maintenance, and application of the formula lies with 
the Ministry of Finance. Although not explicitly stated in either Law No. 33 or 
Government Regulation No. 55, the Ministry of Finance has been administering the 
DAK allocation mechanism through what appears to be an implied authority to create, 
improve, and apply the index-based calculation referred to in Government Regulation 
No. 55. The question whether it is administered in a manner that satisfies the 
requirements of regulatory coherence is discussed further below. The rigid funding 
allocation mechanism underlying the DAK is not necessarily inappropriate, is 
institutionally unsupported, and is potentially inequitable in its rigidity and inflexibility. 
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V. THE REGULATORY NEED FOR A SPECIAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE BODY TO ADMINISTER THE DAK 
 
 
An outcome of the preceding analysis of the regulatory mechanism underlying DAK 
allocation is functionally coherent in spite of the regulatory scheme’s lack of prescription 
and the rigidity of formula-based regulation. However, even though the scheme appears 
to be functioning at present, there is a strong likelihood that the scheme may encounter a 
whole range of problems in the future arising from the weaknesses and rigidity of its 
design. Given the importance of the regulatory scheme (both in its own right and in 
combination with the DAU allocation regulation), it is timely to consider the creation of 
a specialized administrative body to perform a range of tasks relating to both DAK- and 
DAU-related fiscal transfer issues. Both the DAK and DAU are formula-based 
regulatory arrangements. Both involve an effective trade-off between political control, on 
the one hand, and expertise in developing, applying, and monitoring formula-based 
regulation in a transparent, equitable manner on the other. As has been done already 
elsewhere around the world, legislators should consider giving greater flexibility and 
powers to program agencies including: 
i) powers to overcome the potential misallocation and unforeseen inequities of 
funding allocation formulas including special powers to make exceptional 
recommendations; 
ii) powers to alter, amend, revise, upgrade, and maintain the formula; 
iii) a mechanism to enable better representation of the different stakeholders in 
the formula determination and (possibly) application process; and 
iv) mechanisms that institute formal oversight and monitoring mechanisms. 
 
Some insight into the design and functions of an Indonesian agency created to be 
responsible for critical fiscal transfer-related issues and questions can be gained by 
examining the role and operation of the Australian Government’s Commonwealth 
Grants Commission (the Commission). 
 
5.1 The Commonwealth Grants Commission as a Model 
 
The issue of specific grants and problems related to their allocation identified in the 
previous section have several direct parallels to similar issues encountered in Australian 
public financial history (Hancock and Smith 2001). Following a series of fiscal crises after 
Federation in 1901, chronic issues relating to specific funding arrangements led the 
Australian Government to establish the Commonwealth Grants Commission in 1933.8 
The Grants Commission was, in part, an institutional response to the political instability 
and tension between the states and Commonwealth Government arising from difficult 
economic conditions caused by the Depression. In addition, it was also evident that 
differences in economic development meant that the fiscal capacity between the states 
was not converging. 
 
Early in its operational history, the Commission recognized the need to find a ‘principle’ 
that could be applied with consistency to the various circumstances of the different 
states. “The difficulties of measuring ‘disabilities’ and the differences between states in 
the nature of their claims for specific assistance also underscored the need for the 
Commission to develop an approach which was flexible, seemed objective, and was at 
                                               
8Commonwealth Grants Commission Act 1973 
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the same time more practical than attempting to place a money value on the ‘net 
disabilities from federation’” (Hancock and Smith 2001). These characteristics were 
found in the principle of ‘fiscal need’, described by Head (1967), as ‘an ingenious 
reconciliation of the diverse arguments in a principle of financial equality’. The guiding principle 
employed by the Commission in making its assessments for specific grants had been 
unchanged since its adoption in 1936. 
 
The scope of the Commission’s jurisdiction is narrow. First, the Commission’s 
jurisdiction extends only to issues relating to horizontal, not vertical, equalization. 
Therefore, it is restricted to acting in relation to specific funding requests and issues 
rather than playing a more substantive role in Australian fiscal arrangements. Second, the 
Commission functions an advisory body that responds to terms of reference from the 
Minister for Finance and Administration made pursuant to Section 16 of the 
Commonwealth Grants Commission Act and has no authority to initiate action on its 
own accord (Morris 2002). In this context, the Act provides that “the Commission shall 
inquire into and report to the Minister upon: 
 
(a) any application made by a state for the grant, under Section 96 of the 
Constitution, of specific assistance to the state; 
(b) any matters, being matters relating to a grant of assistance made under 
that section to a state either before or after the commencement of this Act, 
that are referred to the Commission by the Minister; and 
(c) any matters, being matters relating to the making of a grant of assistance 
under that section to a state, that are referred to the Commission by the 
Minister.” 
 
These are generally requests for calculating appropriate ratios of per capita grants for 
distributing general revenue assistance from the Commonwealth Government to the 
states and territories. The details of these references are usually negotiated between the 
Commonwealth, state, and territory treasury departments before being formally issued by 
the Commonwealth Minister for Finance and Administration. The Commission reports 
to the Commonwealth Government and immediately after provides copies to the states 
and territories. The Commission's recommendations are then considered at the annual 
meetings of the Treasurers of the Commonwealth, state, and territory. For example, the 
terms of reference for the 2004 Review of State Revenue Sharing Relativities required the 
Commission to review the methods used to determine the per capita relativities for 
distribution of GST (Goods and Services Tax) revenue and healthcare grants. The nature 
of the work was more mechanical than conceptual directed to improving the existing 
principles of equalization (including specification of the qualization model used to assess 
relativities) (Morris 2002; Commonwealth Grants Commission 2004). 
 
The Commission performs an important role in Australian Commonwealth/state fiscal 
relations. However, it has been developed over time to respond to issues associated with 
Australian fiscal federalism. Although it provides insight into how a similar administrative 
decision-making body may make a vital contribution to improving Indonesian fiscal 
arrangements, the Commission does not provide a model that can be directly transposed. 
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5.2 The Indonesian Model 
 
The circumstances underlying fiscal equalization arrangements differ between countries. 
Unlike Australia, which is a federal state, the Republic of Indonesia has a unitary 
constitutional structure. This structural difference affects the distribution of taxation and 
spending powers among different levels of government, which in the case of Indonesia, 
is heavily weighted in favour of the central government. The more centralized Indonesian 
structure is reflected in the close interconnection among the vertical and horizontal 
equalization mechanisms contained in Law No. 33 of 2004. In addition to a closer 
regulatory nexus between horizontal (DAK) and vertical (DAU) fiscal equalization 
mechanisms, Indonesian law (unlike Australian law) prescribes a formula-based approach 
to both DAU and DAK funding allocations. Although funding allocation formulas are 
used in Australia, horizontal equalization formulas are not statutorily mandated and are 
used as technical tools to assist in allocation determination. 
 
These two key structural and compositional differences provide sound reasons for the 
creation of a special administrative body to oversee the governance of Law No. 33 of 
2004. In addition, they also provide the basis for granting a special administrative body 
powers that are jurisdictionally broader and discretionarily deeper than that of the 
Australian Grants Commission. Finally, the creation of a special administrative body 
provides an opportunity to address potential regulatory incoherencies inherent in the 
present structure and composition of Law No. 33 thereby overcoming a range of 
potential regulatory problems described in previous sections of the chapter. 
 
The creation of a special administrative body that is statutorily independent of the 
Ministry of Finance provides several structural and compositional benefits that could 
improve the functioning of the regulatory arrangements. First, the creation of a special 
administrative body made up of representatives from the central government and the 
regional and district governments provides an opportunity to overcome structural issues 
relating to stakeholder participation. By having the various levels of government 
represented within the administrative body, a better balance of political interests, 
conceptual perspectives, and information exchange can be achieved. Improved 
stakeholder participation through administrative representation also increases the 
legitimacy and transparency of the regulatory scheme. 
 
Unlike the Commonwealth Grants Commission, which has no oversight function, the 
compositional coherence of Indonesian fiscal relations would be improved should a 
special administrative body be granted oversight functions. Oversight responsibilities 
have the obvious benefit of correcting or improving transparency and coordination. In 
addition, regulatory oversight can play an important role in bringing procedural discipline 
to the collection and coordination of information, meeting of timelines, and general 
conduct of regulatory tasks. Finally, the most important oversight function to be 
performed would be to oversee the administration of the formula-based regulation 
applied by the Ministry of Finance. 
 
The most critical compositional role of a special administrative body would be to take 
responsibility for the maintenance and amendment of the formula-based regulation. A 
special administrative body is well-suited to becoming a repository of expertise relating to 
the design, construction, and reform of the formula-based regulation. An assignment of 
that function would require the delegation of sufficient powers to make changes to the 
formula (within limited scope) on an ongoing basis. In addition, the administrative body 
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should be granted the authority to act upon special references by the central government 
(or regional governments) in relation to issues relating to the formula-based regulation. 
 
In order to carry out its duties, the administrative body would require a greater set of 
discretionary decision-making powers than those presently contained in Law No. 33. The 
necessary powers would ideally include discretionary powers to make or amend 
procedural aspects such as the application process, discretionary powers to make 
procedural changes to the formula calculation process for purposes of transparency, 
discretionary powers to make non-formula driven adjustments where application of the 
formula produce incoherent outcomes. Finally, the administrative body should be given 
the responsibility of an advisory body similar to that of the Commonwealth Grants 
Commission. In its role as an advisory body, it would be responsible for investigating and 
studying alternative methodologies in fiscal equalization, investigating specific issues 
arising from emergency funding needs, and investigating changing economic and policy 
conditions underlying fiscal equalization. 
 
 
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
The regulatory arrangements relating to specific funding allocations governing 
intergovernmental fiscal arrangements in Indonesia are new. The regulatory scheme is 
controlled and administered by the central government and is based upon a traditional 
command and control regulatory approach having very little external stakeholder 
involvement and participation in the regulatory process. A core compositional element of 
the regulatory scheme is the funding allocation mechanism that is derived from index-
driven formulas developed and applied by the Ministry of Finance. The basic regulatory 
arrangement is formalized in Law No. 33 of 2004. Law No. 33 contains a broad 
regulatory framework and lacks necessary prescription. This lack of prescription is to be 
overcome through the enactment of central government regulations from time to time 
(such as Government Regulation No. 55 of 2005). 
 
An analysis of the regulatory coherence of the scheme examines its systemic, policy, and 
instrumental linkages to determine the consistency, integrity, and transparency of the 
regulatory scheme. At this stage in the DAK’s history, it appears that the broad 
regulatory framework is sufficiently coherent to enable the regulatory scheme to 
function. However, the analysis identifies how the scheme has several structural, 
compositional/substantive, and administrative weaknesses that are likely to hinder the 
scheme and undermine its coherence and operation effectiveness in the future. 
 
The main structural weakness is an imbalance in stakeholder participation. This 
imbalance has systemic and functional implications. Systemically, the structure of the 
regulatory scheme can be seen as contrary to the subsidiarity principle where the design 
of the regulatory arrangement does not reflect a decentralization process that is as 
extensive as it should be. Functionally, this systemic imbalance is reflected in an 
imbalance in stakeholder participation, which can affect the operation of the scheme. A 
second structural weakness is a lack of coordinative and procedural prescription. This 
weakness gives rise to transparency issues relating to the application, allocation, and 
execution of tasks and functions relating to the administration of the scheme. 
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The core compositional feature of the scheme is an index-driven funding allocation 
mechanism. Formula-based regulation often involves the design, construction, and 
maintenance of complex formulas. These tasks require extensive specialist expertise as 
well as a complex balance between administrative authority to develop and apply the 
formula, on the one hand, and both political latitude and oversight on the other. Finally, 
formula development should also involve the input and consensus of affected 
stakeholders. To achieve this balance, the delegation of greater administrative powers 
may be required. The delegating of authority to non-legislative decision-makers, in itself, 
requires careful consideration to achieve a balanced regulatory design. 
 
One means by which many of these issues may be resolved is through the creation of a 
special administrative body set at arms-length from the Ministry of Finance. Proper 
design of such a body provides an opportunity to overcome structural, compositional, 
and administrative concerns with the present scheme. The Australian Commonwealth 
Grants Commission provides an example of such a body and how it is able to contribute 
to improving intergovernmental fiscal relations. However, in the Indonesian context, the 
jurisdictional scope and discretionary depth of powers and functions exercised by such a 
special authority need to be more comprehensive. 
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